The spectacle of the mercenary Wagner group forces advancing on Moscow was shocking but in the end, brief. So much so that the full political and strategic consequences of the crisis remain to be revealed, including whether this spelled the beginning of the end of Putin’s regime or if the threat was effectively managed. Of particular concern during the crisis were the short- and long-term nuclear risks posed by the potential coup, including whether Russian nuclear weapons stored in bases might be vulnerable to capture by Prigozhin’s forces and what chaos and regime change might mean for Russia’s nuclear posture in the long-term.
We know that nuclear weapons possessors make technical, procedural, and doctrinal choices about how to keep their nuclear arsenals secure. This requires a balance between retaining secure “negative” control to avoid the unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons and ensuring “positive control,” the capability to launch nuclear weapons promptly upon orders, and upon loss of central command. Russia takes this issue seriously and despite reports that Wagner forces headed towards Russian nuclear bases, it seems very unlikely that the Wagner group revolt presented a serious risk of taking over command and control of nuclear weapons on a base.
The security of Russia’s nuclear weapons falls to the 12th Chief Directorate or “Gumo,” reportedly a well-trained and well-resourced force of 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers who are prepared to arrive and a defend a nuclear weapons site within two hours, and without whose help warheads cannot be mounted on a missile for delivery, according to a column by Juliet Samuel in The Times UK or activated for use by enabling permissive action links. A US National Security Council spokesman told Reuters that “We have not seen any changes in the disposition of Russian nuclear forces. Russia has a special responsibility to maintain command, control, and custody of its nuclear forces and to ensure that no actions are taken that imperil strategic stability.” And later stated more specifically that “We had no indication at any point that nuclear weapons or materials were at risk.”
However, the larger picture isn’t so reassuring. A nuclear-armed state is still losing a brutal, protracted war of its own initiation on its borders, a dangerous scenario that increases the risk of nuclear use. Russia’s decision to station some of its nuclear weapons in Belarus further increases that risk. The potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations leading to direct conflict between Russia and nuclear-armed NATO is too high, especially considering Russian officials regularly invoke the specter of nuclear weapons use. The guardrails that we have built over years are crumbling and President Putin shows little interest in averting the total collapse of bilateral nuclear arms control.
The Putin regime is unlikely to prioritize efforts to reduce the role and risk of nuclear weapons (the United States, which has committed to rebuilding and replacing its entire nuclear arsenal, is not demonstrating much leadership on this front, either). It is a deeply frustrating situation. However, a chaotic regime change orchestrated by a brutal mercenary force could be catastrophic on a humanitarian scale and there is no assurance that a Russian leader who came to authority under such circumstances would be a more reasonable or moral hand on Russia’s nuclear “button” than Putin. That of course points to a deeper injustice: systems that can almost immediately destroy a functioning society, and over years could threaten the whole of humanity, should not exist and responsibility for using them should not rest in the hands of a single decisionmaker.
Recognizing the US has little ability to shape what is happening within Russia, it should focus on sensible nuclear policies at home, including enacting safer nuclear policies and reducing the massive nuclear weapons budget, as well as remaining open to all opportunities to communicate and deconflict with Russia.
And it’s also important for all parties to take every opportunity to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons to this and all conflicts. The January 2022 commitment of the P5 that they “consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities” should be taken very seriously. China, an important partner for Russia, voiced its opposition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons in its 12-point position statement on Ukraine. Russians are having their own critical internal debates on these issues. For its part, the United States should state unequivocally that the US will not use nuclear weapons or nuclear threats and encourage others to follow suit. The G7 recently stated, urged on by civil society, that they would recommit to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and the G20 issued an even stronger statement condemning “the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” More than 1,000 scientists, including Nobel Prize laureates, Shaw Prize winners, and members of the US National Academy of Sciences, have recently signed a statement condemning all threats to use nuclear weapons. On this point, we should ensure actions match words.