Read what UCS experts expect from the second Trump administration on climate and energy, food and agriculture, science and democracy, transportation, and engaging with states.
The last Trump administration was damaging to international peace and security. President Trump withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka the Iran Deal), and the Open Skies Treaty. The last Trump administration also failed to renew the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), something the Biden administration took care of within their first few days in office.
President Trump alienated US allies and embraced authoritarians. We also saw aggressive rhetoric towards North Korea that then morphed into an exchange of love letters with Kim Jong Un.
What we experienced in the first Trump administration and heard on the campaign trail this year informs what I and other UCS global security experts expect to happen in the second Trump administration. It looks grim. Nevertheless, there is much advocates in the United States can do in the coming four years amid what might be chaotic nuclear policy.
We can develop Congressional champions and build power with their constituencies.
While the acute, short-term crises of the next Trump administration will demand attention and action, we have inherited problems that have existed for decades—and will take persistence to solve. We cannot let the chaos of the next four years prevent us from building power for the future.
Congressional leaders will have a critical role to play in checking the excesses of the executive branch. Unfortunately, in the three decades since the end of the Cold War, decisionmakers have lost a lot of expertise and experience in nuclear issues. Leaders from the Congressional Progressive Caucus and the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group are working to rebuild those muscles. Legislators and non-governmental experts must continue working together to develop analyses, provide oversight, and demand accountability from the second Trump administration.
As advocates we must engage with our elected officials on nuclear policy to emphasize that their constituents care about these issues, and we must ensure these officials exercise the power they have to reduce nuclear dangers and advance nuclear justice.
We can prevent a return to explosive nuclear testing.
The last Trump administration discussed bringing back a dangerous relic of the Cold War: explosive nuclear testing. Russia has stated it is ready to resume testing at any moment. We need to be on guard for any attempts by the next Trump administration to resume explosive nuclear testing. As advocates, we must work to reinforce the norms against explosive nuclear testing and emphasize that the costs of testing outweigh the benefits for the United States.
The US National Laboratories annually certify that the nuclear stockpile is reliable, a confirmation that explosive nuclear testing is not necessary to maintain the country’s nuclear arsenal. The United States has observed a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing since 1992. But it has also maintained the ability to conduct new tests at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), it would take as little as 6 to 10 months of preparation to conduct a simple test for “political purposes,” should the president order one.
A single nuclear test would have disastrous global consequences, likely leading other states to conduct their own nuclear tests in response. The local consequences could be serious; even underground explosive nuclear tests can result in the contamination of land and water or the leakage of dangerous radionuclides. Any explosive nuclear test would also be a moral injustice to frontline communities that are still fighting to clean contaminated land and obtain acknowledgment and compensation for health consequences like cancer and lung disease from the legacy of development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons.
Should the new Trump administration announce an intention to resume explosive nuclear testing, it will be necessary to mobilize policymakers, frontline communities, scientists, and other activists in opposition. We would need all hands on deck to prevent a second era of explosive nuclear testing and the generations of damage that would follow.
We can pursue nuclear justice.
As advocates we can support and elevate the voices of those most closely affected by US nuclear weapons. It is important to hear from communities that have suffered harm from the legacy of development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. People in these communities have valuable lived experience to convey. These communities are burdened by adverse health impacts like cancer and chronic lung disease from the US legacy of nuclear weapons and are not being adequately acknowledged or compensated for the harms they have endured.
Throughout the US nuclear enterprise, it is important to ensure that health and environmental impacts on communities are investigated thoroughly and seen as a priority. Communities must be given a voice. We can push the next administration to listen more closely to affected communities, to work with Congress to pass the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) to aid harmed communities, and to sign RECA when it passes. This legislation has been a strongly bipartisan effort, and we could make progress on it even in an otherwise difficult political environment.
We can manage the bilateral relationship with Russia.
Collectively, the United States and Russia hold 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
Right now, the number of strategic nuclear weapons the United States and Russia can legally deploy is constrained by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). This treaty expires in February 2026. Russia is currently refusing to implement the treaty due to US support for Ukraine, and it has also said it will not discuss a follow-on treaty with the United States. Despite this, the United States did report on its overall deployed numbers for 2023. The United States needs a willing partner in bilateral discussions, and until Russia is willing to re-engage there will not be progress on a follow-on agreement.
The last Trump administration was unenthusiastic in their pursuit of a renewal of the current treaty and may drag their feet on a follow-on treaty—or worse they could withdraw from the New START before it expires in 2026. Alternatively, President-elect Trump’s boasting about his great relationship with Russia’s leader might motivate his next administration to make some progress in this area. It is difficult to predict.
In either situation, as advocates we can continue to push the next administration to pursue dialogue with Russia without preconditions and to be ready to negotiate a follow-on agreement once there is a partner willing to sit at the table.
If the Trump administration withdraws from New START—as President-elect Trump did with many treaties the last time he held office —it will be important for advocates to strongly oppose any moves to increase the number of deployed nuclear weapons.
We saw during the Cold War how arms race dynamics played out with the Soviet Union. The fear of not having enough nuclear weapons drives the numbers up and up as each side strives to have more than the other. Deploying more nuclear weapons risks a runaway arms race and instability.
Even if the New START expires without any follow-on treaty in place, the United States must show leadership and confidence and help preserve an environment where future arms control is still possible